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THE RICARDIAN MODEL OF ENERGY SERVICE COMPANIES 
TRANSBOUNDARY COOPERATION 
 
 
У статті викладено аргументи на користь 
доцільності системного поєднання 
рікардіанської моделі порівняної переваги 
та моделі перфоманс-контрактингу в задачі 
підвищення ефективності транскордонної 
взаємодії енергосервісних компаній. 
Формалізовано основні аспекти побудови 
запропонованої системної моделі та 
представлено результати розрахунків, що 
підтверджують її ефективність. 
 
 
In this article the arguments confirming 
practicability of the Ricardian model of 
comparative advantage and the performance-
contracting model system integration for the 
efficiency improvement of energy service 
companies’ transboundary cooperation are 
given. The basic aspects of the proposed 
system model are formalized and the results of 
computer calculations which confirm its 
efficiency are presented. 
 
 
Statement of a problem in a general view. Consistent tendency to the growth  
of energy consumption in the world, due to the objective needs of countries’ economic  
development on the one hand, and the limited and inhomogeneous placement of natural  
energy  resources  on  the  planet  on  the  other  hand,  put  the  issue  of  energy  efficiency  on  the   
same level with the problems of energy security of the countries, which today have to be  
solved in conditions of the active and even aggressive energy markets redistribution in the  
direction  of  their  globalization,  diversification  of  supply  sources,  use  of  alternative  energy  
resources, etc. 
The sphere of the energy services is an essential part of any country’s energy sector which 
provides complex problems solutions of efficiency, quality and reliability improvements of energy 
supply and energy consumption, as it should reconcile the interests of manufacturers, suppliers and 
consumers  of  products  and  services  in  both  energy  and  a  variety  of  related  industries  of  the  
country’s economy. 
International (transboundary, cross-border, etc.) cooperation creates a fundamentally new 
challenges in the field of energy services provision, aimed at carrying out upgrade and  
innovative technical and technological development of each company and national economies  
of the countries which cooperate, and are realized through the interaction of manufacturers and 
financial institutions, energy service companies and state and local authorities in the market 
environment.  
At  the  same  time,  the  efficiency  and  effectiveness  of  transboundary  cooperation  in  the  
sphere of energy services provision today cannot be considered satisfactory, especially due to the 
unaccounted in this process specific features of energy service companies’ activities in the 
interrelated markets of the fuel and energy resources, energy-efficient equipment and energy 
services, systemically coordinated with the conceptual fundamentals of the theory of absolute and 
comparative advantages which to a certain extent determine the characteristics of effectiveness and 
efficiency of this interaction. 
The analysis of researches and publications of last years. Modern theory of international 
transboundary cooperation is based upon the scientific researches of A. Smith, D. Ricardo,  
E. Heckscher, J. Hicks, B. Ohlin, V. Leontief, P. Samuelson, P. Krugman, as well as works of  
A. P. Kireev, O. V. Sidorovich, K. S. Solonenko, A. S. Philipenko and many others [1, p.36–37;  
2, p.410–411; 3, p.253; 4, p.810, 821]. 
Historically first Smith’s and Ricardo’s models were built on the principles of the theory of 
labor cost, where the major factor, determining the benefits from production of services due to the 
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transboundary interaction, is considered work. Smith’s model is based on the principle of absolute 
advantage in the production of services, where export of services is considered beneficial for the 
country (company, etc.), which produces them at a lower cost of resources (in our consideration at a 
lower cost of production time) than the partner country (company), and imports those services, in 
which the absolute advantage belongs to cooperation partners. 
Ricardo’s model is based on a more universal principle of comparative advantage  
of the country in the production of specific services at lower economic costs than in other  
countries. Within his approach Ricardo reveals opportunities of applying the principles of  
natural advantages in the production of services specified by the unique natural resources  
and climatic conditions of the country, and the principle of the advantage achieved by the country 
due to more efficient technologies and use of highly-qualified specialists. At the same time,  
his model of comparative advantage has a quite significant drawback – it can be only applied  
to countries and companies, with almost equal production potential, and where changes in  
domestic demand in one country will noticeably influence the level of prices in another  
country (company). 
Heckscher-Ohlin model is based on the principles of the theory of factors of production, 
where the export of services is considered beneficial, when there is a surplus of factors of 
production in the country for their production, and, on the contrary, it has to import the services for 
production of which it has scarce resources. Samuelson has strengthened the theoretical basis of 
Heckscher–Ohlin model introducing the principle of price equilibrium of factors of production, 
which takes place due to transboundary interaction. 
Krugman's model with more details than the previous ones, describes the complex 
relationship  between  the  quantity  of  companies  on  the  market  and  the  price  of  their  services,  
according to which the more companies are on the market, the less is the amount of production of 
each of them, the higher are average costs per unit of service, however the higher is the competition, 
the lower are the prices. In this case, if the price of production is above the market one, the new 
companies appear, and if on the contrary the production price is below the market, companies 
disappear. 
The results of more detailed analysis of models of comparative advantage can be found in 
the following publications [1, p.10–11; 2, p. 83–98; 3, p.239–240; 4, p.341–350]. 
Energy service companies (ESCO) which operate on performance-contracting basis, are one 
of the most effective and most commonly-used in the world organizational form of the energy 
efficiency of national economies improvement, which effectiveness has been proved practically 
both in developed and developing countries. The ideologist and author of most of conceptual 
statements  of  modern  ESCO-model  is  considered  to  be  Sh.  Hansen,  and  the  ideologist  of  its  
dissemination in Europe is P. Bertoldi, to whom more than ten published monographs on this topic, 
including [5, p.29–38; 6, s.1–12] belong. 
ESCOs are commercial organizations (companies, enterprises), acting on the basis of the 
energy-service contract and providing a wide range of complex energy services that cover technical, 
economic, financial and legal aspects of design, engineering, installation, commissioning, 
monitoring and verification of the results achieved from the implementation of innovative projects 
in the area of energy savings and energy infrastructure development at the industrial, communal and 
social facilities, based on the principles of the performance-contracting, energy outsourcing, project 
financing, taking into account transaction costs and risk management, etc., through the use of their 
own and attracting external sources and resources including financial, legal, material, technical, 
energy and labor ones. 
Energy performance-contracting is the main form of providing complex «turnkey»  
services  by  ESCO,  which  offers  their  clients  a  full  set  of  business-projects  to  improve   
energy efficiency and energy conservation, the results of which are monitored (measured  
and verified) during the conditions of the contract, and provides guarantees that the savings 
achieved as a result of the projects implementation will be sufficient enough to cover the projects 
total costs [5, p.1–7, 29–38, 197–220]. 
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Manufacturers of energy-efficient equipment, energy supply companies, energy engineering 
and energy maintenance companies often operate as effective energy service companies. However, 
the energy services of ESCOs are fundamentally different from other types of energy service 
companies – suppliers. [5, p.1–38, p.197–220; 6, p.1–12; 7, p.5–19; 8, p.51–53]. 
Most of the problematic issues related to the specific features of the ESCOs on the domestic 
energy resources, energy-efficient equipment and energy services markets are already solved in 
theory and in practice of ESCO-approach implementation. First of all, you should apply to the 
publications of such researchers as P. Bertoldi, J. Bleyl-Androschin, C. Bullock, G. Caraghiaur,  
J. Ellis, M. Evans, C. Goldman, S. Hansen, N. Hopper, B. Knox, M. Kolarik, P. Langlois, M. Lee, 
V. Lew, M. Magee, A. Marino, C. Murakoshi, H. Nakagami, N. Okay, J. Osborn, J. Painuly,  
H. Park, S. Rezessy, D. Schinnerl, S. Sorrell, A. Thumann, W. Turner, E. Vine, H. Zhao, and 
others. Among the researchers in Ukraine and on post-Soviet space the publications of  
I. A. Bashmakov, S. V. Golìkova, V. A. Zhovtyanskiy, M. P. Kovalko, E. E. Nikitin,  
A. V. Prahovnik, S.V. Sìvayev, V.A. Stepanenko, O.M. Sukhodolia, Y.I. Shulga, and others, should 
be  mentioned  in  which  the  conceptual  basis  of  foundation  and  the  basic  principles  of  ESCOs  
performance are considered. 
Regarding the specific features of the ESCOs concerning their costs, first of all, the major 
role of transaction costs should be noted. The latter incur both inside the companies and outside it, 
as a result of their interactions in the energy services market and include any necessary costs that 
are not connected directly to the production of goods and services (production costs), but provide 
the successful implementation of transboundary cooperation. The concept of transaction costs was 
introduced into economics by R. Coase in the 30-s of the last century for substantiating the 
existence of firms and companies on the market, which in its essence are hierarchically-structured 
systems with the administratively-command management. Among many fundamental publications 
on the theory of transaction costs, which have been analyzed in this article, we should first mention 
the works of such researchers as K. Arrow, U. Asan, P. J. Buckley, M. Chapman, S. Cheung,  
R. H. Coase, N. Foss, C. Kadaifci, A. Kutlu, D. C. North, J. Ju, S. Sorrell, E. Wang,  
O. E. Williamson, and S. Yu. Barsukova and R. I. Kapelyushnikov. Despite the large number of 
fundamental publications, including monographs, most of which are made on verbal level,  
scientific works dedicated to the formalization of identified laws and especially their use for 
quantitative parameters identification of transboundary cooperation, there is a very small number  
[9, p.518–519; 10, p.154–157; 11, p.129–137], which underline the difficulty of this problem 
solving. 
Unsolved parts of the general problem. Despite the fundamental achievements in the 
theory and practice in the three abovementioned areas of research, the problem of quantitative 
evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency of transboundary cooperation among ESCOs on 
domestic and international markets, first of all, evaluation and realization of comparative advantage 
potential still remains unsolved. 
The idea of the article.The purpose of this article is to justify the selection of comparative 
advantage and performance-contracting economic models, in the task of effectiveness improvement 
of ESCOs transboundary cooperation, formalization of system model equations on this basis, 
calculations provision and presentation of results, confirming the efficiency of the proposed model 
used in this task. 
Statement of the basic material. Taking into account the Sorrell’s methodical approach in 
constructing a performance-contracting model [9, p.512–513], we can define the first condition of 
viability (more accurately, self-supporting) of ESCO approach in the following form: the client’s 
total cost savings, before and after signing the contract, should exceed the client's payments under 
the contract with ESCO (contract payments) in the amount of potential gain of the client under the 
contract, namely: 
                                                           0 0 0 0 0 0pr pr tr tr(C C ) (C C ) P B- + - = +
) ( ) ( ( (
,            (1) 
where: 0prC
)
– are the client’s production costs before the contract signing (this is indicated by the 
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superscript); 0trC
)
– the client’s transaction costs on the same conditions; 0prC
(
– the client’s production 
costs on the object of energy services under the contract, after the contract signing (indicated by the 
superscript); 0trC
(
 – the client’s transaction costs on the same conditions; 0P
(
– the client’s contract 
payments (ESCO income); 0B
(
– the client’s potential gain according to the contract. 
The second condition for self-supporting of ESCO-approach states that the income of ESCO 
under the contract should be more than the total amount of expenses, incurred by ESCO, by the 
amount of its gain: 
1 0 1 1 1
pr trP P (C C ) B= + +
( (( ( (
= ,            (2) 
where: 1B
(
– is ESCO’s bonus according to the contract; the upper index 1 will determine the 
expenses of ESCO on the object of energy services under the contract after the contract signing (the 
superscript)). 
The third condition for self-supporting of ESCO-approach is that the client and ESCO 
overall production cost savings should exceed the overall increase in the transaction costs by the 
opportunity costs of the client: 
0 0 1 1 0 0 0
pr pr pr tr tr tr alt(C C ) C C (C C ) C- - - + +
) ( ( ) ( (
= .            (3) 
where 0altC
(
– opportunity costs of the client after the contract signing. 
As it’s necessary to take into account other kinds of costs, besides those mentioned in 
equations  (1)  –  (3),  such  as  distribution  costs  associated  with  the  promotion  by  ESCO  of  energy  
services and goods on the transboundary markets (for example, freight forwarding, customs, port, 
etc. costs), it is advisable to generalize the system (1) – (3) in the form of: 
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where lower index i 1, n=  will list the relevant costs, introduced by indexes i (pr, tr, ds, ...)= ; ds  – 
distribution costs index. 
In case of client's  cooperation with several  ESCOs or ESCO with several  clients,  for each 
case there are similar equation systems (4). Also note that the presented (1) – (4) equations are some 
kind of economic balance equations. It is clear that to complete mathematical description of the 
interactions between the client and ESCO, these equations have to be supplemented by the relevant 
equations of energy balances which restrict the acceptable modes of energy equipment operation 
and adjust the rules of mutual payments between the client and ESCO, caused mainly by changes in 
production amounts, and the corresponding decrease in the consumption of fuel and energy 
resources, and loading of the energy equipment which are the objects of ESCO services contract. 
While choosing the model of comparative advantage we should notice once again that 
ESCO by its main function is a service-oriented, and not a production company, so the bulk of its 
expenses (up to 70%) are expenditures on intellectual work, and other types of costs are usually 
taken by manufacturers of energy-efficient equipment and suppliers of fuel and energy resources. 
Therefore, the use of Ricardian model [1, p.10–11; 2, p.83–98, 4, p.341–350], where the only factor 
of production is labor and which assumes that each technology can be only characterized by one 
coefficient of labor productivity – by laboriousness, in our case, is justified and allows to conduct a 
quantitative evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency of transboundary cooperation between 
such ESCOs. 
Let’s consider the peculiarities of the Ricardian model application on the example of two 
ESCOs, located in different countries, which intend to cooperate with each other, in buying and 
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selling goods and services. We will define each ESCO by top index j (in this case j=1,2). Suppose 
that each of the ESCOs, using existing technology, is able to provide two types of services, which 
can be defined by the lower index i=1,2. Then, the production of each of these services according to 
the Ricardian model will be characterized by its own factor of labor productivity jit , and the 
existing limits of production opportunities and options for the use of labor resources can be put in 
the form of : 
1 1 1 2 2 2
i i i i
i i
( Q ) L ; ( Q ) Lt × £ t × £å å ,            (5) 
where: iQ – the amount of i -the service production during the working hours which are considered; 
jL , j 1, 2=  – limited amount of labor resources, which j -the ESCO possesses.  
In  conditions  of  constant  labor  costs,  as  well  as  the  amount  of  available  labor  resources,  
production opportunity curves are straight lines, which equations assume the following form in 
coordinate axes 1 2Q Q : 
1 1 2 2
1 1 2 21 1
2 1 2 11 1 2 2
2 2 2 2
L LQ Q ; Q Qt t= - × = - ×t t t t .            (6) 
Equations (6) showing that opportunity costs of the first service production, expressed in 
units of the second one, or costs of substitution (substitution costs) of the first service by another 
one, is defined by the ratio between labor costs on the first and second services production j j1 2( / )t t  
by each of the companies. Remember that the amount of losses incurred by the company in 
connection with refuse from production of one service due to increased production of another 
service on 1 unit defines the opportunity costs of existing resources used. Adding these costs to the 
amount  of  the  actual  (explicit)  production  costs  that  are  fixed  in  accounting  book  allows  the  
company to specify the amount of lost profit, related to irrational distribution of available resources, 
refuse from other possibilities of their use in production of alternative services, etc. 
To select from a number of possible combinations of a particular kind and amount of each of 
the two services, those which are profitable for ESCO to produce, the comparison criterion of 
relative price of one of the service measured per unit of the other service (the price of the 
substitution of one service by the other) is used in the Ricardian model. Let j1p  and 
j
2p  be the prices 
of the first and the second services of j -the ESCO, then the labor costs per hour jil  will be equal to 
the costs of the first and the second services produced per hour: j j ji i i(p / )l = t . If j j1 2(p / p ) > j j1 2( / )t t , 
i.e. the  substitution price of the first service by the second one is more than alternative production 
costs of these services, then labor costs per hour will be higher in the production of the first service, 
and  under  the  condition  of  j j1 2(p / p ) <
j j
1 2( / )t t  –  the  same  but  for  the  second  service.  Taking  into  
account the natural need of employees to receive higher payment for their labor, ESCOs according 
to the Ricardian model will specialize in production of one of the services and only under condition 
of equal payment for both of them – both services.  
Let’s assume that: 
2 2 1 1
1 2 1 2( / ) ( / )t t t t> , or the same as 1 2 1 22 2 1 1( / ) ( / )t t t t> .             (7) 
The first inequality of two in (7) is called the formula of relative advantage, which shows 
that  the  labor  costs  for  the  substitution  of  one  unit  of  the  first  service  by  the  second  service  for  
ESCO1 are lower than in ESCO2. In this case, ESCO1 turns out to be more effective in production 
of the first service than the second one (the second inequality), i.e. has comparative advantage over 
ESCO2 in production of this service. 
Thus, to select a more beneficial company for production of the first service in conditions of 
transboundary cooperation is not enough just to compare labor costs of both ESCOs necessary for 
production of one unit of this service and to make a decision on starting its production on the basis 
of such absolute advantage. According to Ricardo’s theory, company should rely on the principle of 
comparative advantage, taking into account production costs of each of the services that both 
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companies are potentially able to produce (provide to the market). 
Prices for these services, which under the principle of absolute advantage depended solely 
on the internal factors of production, under conditions of transboundary cooperation should also 
take into account market supply and demand factors for the services that now are exported or 
imported, because the ESCO, which has lower prices, in market conditions begins to compete with 
other companies for the transboundary market share, that in turn stimulates the relative price 
equalization (equilibrium) for these services. The final result of equilibrium is that market prices are 
somewhere between the existing relative prices, and their definite level will be conditioned by the 
amount of mutual demand and supply. That is, the price of imported services will depend on the 
price of the service that company want to export, to pay for the import, and the ratio of these prices 
will depend on domestic demand for these services in the sphere of influence of each of the ESCOs 
[1, s.17–20; 2, p.87–94]. 
Let ESCO1 labor effectiveness in the production of the first and the second services (i.e. the 
amount of each of these services, produced per unit of time) be 1 11 11/a = t , 1 12 21/a = t , and the  
substitution price of the first service by the second one be 1 11 2(p / p ) , where 
1 1
1 2p i p  are equilibrium 
prices under transboundary cooperation. Under these conditions, ESCO1 has a choice, to produce 
(to supply) per hour either 11a  units of the first service, or 12a  units of the second service, because it 
has the possibilities to produce and sell the surplus of the first service and buy (and not to produce) 
the necessary amount of second service in the ratio of 1 unit of the first service per 1 11 2(p / p )  units of 
the second one. This will allow ESCO1 to receive per 1 unit of used labor time 1 1 1 12 1 2 1Q (p / p )
* = ×a  
units of the second service, and this procedure of substitution of their own ( internal) production of 
this service by import will be profitable for ESKO1 while 1 12 2Q
* a> , or: 
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 2 2 1 1 2(p / p ) ( / ) ( / )a a = t t> ,        (8) 
that is until it is able to receive a greater amount of the second service from abroad for its export of 
the first service than to buy it on the domestic market or to produce and provide it by itself.  
It  is  easy  to  notice  that  the  inequality  (8)  is  the  same  as  the  formula  of  comparative  
advantage (7), so for ESCO1 the best strategy would be transboundary cooperation with ESCO2, 
oriented on increase of export of the first service and import of scarce amount of the second service, 
and for ESCO2 on the contrary, focused on increase of export of the second service and import of 
the first one. Such strategy «of indirect production» (indirect method of production) in conditions of 
market economy also allows to increase the consumption of both services in each country. For the 
calculations of transboundary cooperation values are proposed to apply the following formulas: 
1 1 1
1 1 1Q (1 ) Q= + d ×
(
;   1 2 2 1 1 12/1 1 2 2 1 2/1p ((p / p ) p p ) d= × - × ;   1 1 11 1 1Q= d ×D ;   1 1 12/1 2/1 1R p= ×D ,         (9) 
where: 11Q
(
– amount of service 1 enlarged production by ESCO1; 1 1 1 2 21 2 1 2 1( / / )d = t t - t t  – coefficient 
of service 1 enlarged production; 11D  – amount of alternative service 1 production; 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2/1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2d exp( (Q Q ) / ( Q Q ))= -t × - t × + t ×
(
– transboundary demand curve equation. 
On the basis of equations and formulas (1) – (9) the computer model  
of comparative advantage of ESCO transboundary cooperation has been realized in tabulated  
Excel-processor  with the use of Solver optimizing program, which allows to make  
series of parametric calculations and presents the results of calculations in table and graphic  
forms. 
For example, the results of the model calculations of the amount of alternative service 1 
production (a/service 1) as well as production possibilities lines before and after ESCOs 
cooperation  are  presented  on  Figure  1.  On  Figure  2  you  can  see  the  calculated   amount  of  
alternative revenue 12/1R , received by ESCO1 due to transboundary cooperation with ESCO2, from 
the  substitution of service 2 by service 1 (a/revenue 2/1), which are measured by the right vertical 
axis in foreign currency 1 (the currency of ESCO1), from the price 12/1p  of transboundary 
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substitution of service 2 by service 1 (t/substitution price 2/1 in currency 1), calculated by the 
exponential curve 12/1d  of transboundary demand for the substitution of service 2 by service 1 
(t/demand 2/1) and from the amount 11D  of alternative service 1 production (a/service 1), necessary 
for transboundary substitution, and all that – is the result of change  in the amount 11Q
(
 of service 1 
production by ESCO1. 
It  is  seen  that  in  the  considered  range  of  enlarged  production  (provision)  of  service  1  the  
amount of alternative revenue of ESCO1 from its transboundary cooperation with ESCO2 has been 
steadily growing, and by amount of 39.1 natural units of service 1 production and the price of 
transboundary substitution of 1.74 monetary units in currency 1 is 28.0 monetary units in  
currency  1  At  the  same  time,  the  amount  of  alternative  revenue  of  ESCO2  from  its   
transboundary cooperation with ESCO1 is 15.45 monetary units in currency 2, which is received  
as a result of production (provision) of 73,7 natural units of service 2 by the price of  
transboundary substitution of service 1 by service 2 in the amount of 0.39 monetary units in 
currency 2. 
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Conclusions and prospects of the further studies.  Despite the accepted assumptions, 
the Ricardian model supplemented with client objects’ sub-models, in this case, ESCOs, and 
with formalized procedures of transboundary cooperation parameters definition allows to 
calculate, transparently enough, the numerical values of benefits from such interaction for  
all of its participants, taking into account their absolute and comparative advantages in 
technology and labor productivity, the difference in payments for labor and the amount of 
labor resources available. It is important that the defined values of comparative advantage 
theory can be applied to both cross-border and transboundary cooperation between definite 
areas, regions, and other administrative-territorial divisions and units, in one or in different  
countries. 
The prospects for further comparative advantage research in the field of energy 
services  are  primarily  conditioned  by  the  need  to  supplement  the  model  of  comparative  
advantage with the equations of energy balances that will give a chance to use this extended 
model in technical and economic calculations of benefits from investments attraction in 
energy systems’ equipment upgrading, such as the gas transportation system of Ukraine, 
taking into account comparative advantages that arise as a result of use of the saved volumes 
of natural gas under transportation as a substitution product. 
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